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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

GENETIC INFORMATION AND THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTEXT:
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SOCIAL MEANING OF GENETIC
INFORMATION AND INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY

KEN M. GATTER*

PART I – INTRODUCTION
Current genetic information laws are controversial and confusing.1 Some
people advocate stronger legal safeguards for any use of genetic information
and others complain that current state and federal regulations are overly
protective. The critics assert that the laws fail to adequately distinguish
between clinical and research contexts.2 They complain that new genetic
privacy statutes make genetic research too onerous and will curtail important
medical research. In the New England Journal of Medicine, representatives of
* Assistant Professor of Pathology, Oregon Health & Sciences University, Portland, Oregon;
Adjunct Professor of Law, Willamette College of Law, Salem, Oregon. I thank Anne, Alex,
Aidan and Ben for support and assistance. Also thanks to Susan Oliver for administrative
assistance.
1. Health law practitioners acknowledge confusion surrounding health information
generally, commenting that, “No concrete scheme for regulating the collection, storage, use, and
disclosure of human biological data presently exists, giving rise to much speculation and debate
over how and by whom this information should be monitored and controlled.” Karen E. Glover
et al., Collisions at the Intersection: Law and Bioinformatics, 11 BNA HEALTH L. REP. 233, 233
(2002). State laws regulating medical privacy have been described as a “morass” and “erratic.”
See Andrew A. Skolnick, Opposition to Law Officers Having Unfettered Access to Medical
Records, 279 JAMA 257, 257 (1998).
2. For a good critical overview of many of the issues surrounding medical research on
human subjects, see Beverly Woodward, Challenges to Human Subject Protections in US
Medical Research, 282 JAMA 1947 (1999). Woodward writes,
In recent years, however, in discussions regarding consent requirements, expedited
review, medical privacy, genetic studies, research with the mentally ill, and other topics, it
has become common to read or hear statements by medical researchers that assert the
primacy of the interests of science and society and that place the burden of justification on
those who would put any obstacles in the way of scientific and societal goals. These
assertions are often accompanied by an unwillingness to admit that there are any true
conflicts between progress of science and the protection of human subjects.
Id. at 1948. See also Jocelyn Kaiser, Researchers Say Rules Are Too Restrictive, 294 SCI. 2070
(2001); L. Joseph Melton III, The Threat to Medical-Records Research, 337 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1466 (1997) (reviewing medical records research at the Mayo Clinic and discussing Minnesota’s
statute limiting access to medical records for research purposes).
423
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the Association of American Medical Colleges (“AAMC”) warn that genetic
privacy rules that “restrict or prohibit the release of medical information for
research purposes . . . . might marginally enhance patient privacy, but at a
potentially steep cost to public health.”3 The Secretary of the Department of
Health and Human Services received a letter in November of 2001 from the
AAMC, various researchers and academic hospitals warning that regulations
safeguarding genetic information severely threatened medical research.4
Most arguments for a distinction between research and clinical contexts are
practical ones. The arguments fall into three general categories. The first is
that genetic privacy statutes will lead to less research. The second is that
genetic information in the research context is unlikely to lead to discrimination
in the workplace or health insurance.5 The third argument is that it is difficult
to distinguish between genetic information and other medical information.6
In this article, I propose a theoretical position for developing legal
safeguards that recognize a distinction between genetic information in the
research and clinical contexts. The role of individual identity is central to my
criticism of how current regulations over-protect all genetic information.
Identity is also the keystone to my proposed alternative regulatory scheme for
genetic information.
The analysis begins with a critique of the current regulatory approach to
protecting all genetic information regardless of context or substance. Many
legal safeguards designed to protect individuals from misuse of their genetic
information focus only on the fact that the information is genetic instead of
looking at the substantive content that the genetic information represents. This
myopia detrimentally alters the social meaning7 of genetic information by
3. Jennifer Kulynych & David Korn, The Effect of the New Federal Medical-Privacy Rule
on Research, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 201, 201 (2002).
4. Id. Kulynych and Korn note that over 180 “leading research universities, medical
schools, teaching and community hospitals, and medical specialty and scientific societies” signed
the letter. Id. at 204 n.2. On March 27, 2002, Secretary Thompson proposed to modify the
federal medical privacy rule. The AAMC submitted a formal comment letter on April 11, 2002.
See Letter from Jordan J. Cohen, M.D., Association of American Medical Colleges, to Tommy G.
Thompson, Secretary of U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (Apr. 11, 2002),
available at http://www.aamc.org/advocacy/library/hipaa/corres/2002/041102.htm.
5. This statement is supported by various rationales, including that researchers do not
disclose information that is easily connected to any particular individual. Another point is that
the information from research is not useful to insurers or employers because research typically
addresses small questions and the answers do not have clinical significance without extensive
additional research.
6. See Lawrence O. Gostin & James G. Hodge, Jr., Genetic Privacy and the Law: An End
to Genetic Exceptionalism, 40 JURIMETRICS J. 21 (1999).
7. There are many articles and books written on the subjects of social meaning, norms and
social construction. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L.
REV. 943 (1995); Cass R. Sustein, Social Norms and Social Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903
(1996); Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the
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promoting the idea that a person’s DNA is the essence of a person. Laws
should instead regard genetic information as representing one attribute among
many other important attributes, such as personality, ambition and character.
When the law protects information only because it is genetic, then the law
encourages a shift in the social meaning of genetic information toward a
“genetic essentialism.” This change in social meaning alters our notions of
identity. It is one thing to believe that our future health is heavily influenced
by our individual genetic make-up. It is quite another thing to believe that we
are “nothing more than our genes.” This change in the social meaning of
genetic information that our current regulatory scheme promotes has
deleterious effects on our identity and our belief in autonomy.
Laws must consider the context within which genetic information arises to
prevent erosion of beliefs in autonomy and identity. The law should protect
genetic information in the clinical context since such information likely has
concrete clinical meaning and might lead to discrimination.8 In the clinical
setting, a person’s genetic information may form a substantial portion of their
identity. However, even in the clinical setting, an individual’s identity is more
than a mere sum of genomic information, just as it is greater than a list of his
or her physical ailments. Admittedly, genetic information may have attributes
similar to race, religion, gender and other features of identity that might lead to
discrimination and comprise an essential part of a person’s sense of who he or
she is. However, in the research context, genetic attributes are typically not yet
tied to identity because the genetic information uncovered is unlikely to have
clinical significance. In other words, why should the law grant a privacy
interest to every individual’s entire genetic information regardless of whether
the information has any clinical significance or is likely to lead to
discrimination? Why should the law grant a privacy interest to genetic
information that says nothing meaningful about an individual’s identity? If the
law protects this kind of information only because it is genetic, this changes
the social meaning of genetic information and individual identity.
I propose a way to recognize the context within which genetic information
arises and a fluid means to evaluate when genetic information becomes
sufficiently tied to individual identity to merit legal protection. This approach

Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77 (1999). The author applies law and norms theory to
scientific research and concludes that laws that “reinforce and reflect efficient norms” are
superior. Id. at 80. One facet of many social norm theories is that the social meaning must
remain uncovered to be effective. As soon as society’s members become aware that the particular
social meaning is socially constructed then the meaning changes. See generally ROBERTO
MANGABEIRA UNGER, SOCIAL THEORY: ITS SITUATION AND ITS TASK (1987).
8. But see Colin S. Diver & Jane Maslow Cohen, Genophobia: What is Wrong with Genetic
Discrimination?, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1482 (2001) (concluding that a “regime of genetic
transparency” rather than concentrating on genetic privacy is better on the grounds of fairness and
efficiency).
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focuses on the substantive character of the information instead of elevating
information on the exclusive criteria of whether it is genetic (as many genetic
privacy statutes do), thereby undermining traditional constructs of identity.
For example, under the proposed approach genetic research that uncovers
whether a person has a substantial risk for developing a serious neurological
disorder would merit strong legal protections because the information
reasonably impacts the individual’s identity.9 In contrast, research looking at
genetic information that does not have clinical significance should not receive
legal protections because it does not reasonably impact individual identity.
The vehicle that will distinguish between these two contexts, as well as allow
fluidity in the large area between these two examples, is the tort of
misappropriation of identity.10
This article has two main points. The first part discusses how genetic
privacy statutes that do not distinguish between the research and clinical
contexts change the social meaning of genetic information. The second part
addresses the proposed alternative approach, which borrows the tort of
misappropriation of identity from tort law. Rather than protecting genetic
information solely because it is genetic information, the tort of
misappropriation of identity keeps our emphasis on traditional elements of
individual identity, protecting those pieces of information that might
reasonably impact identity. Instead of elevating genetic information and
thereby adversely altering its social meaning, the tort of misappropriation of
identity provides a way to more accurately describe the individual interests at
stake in the use of genetic information. This proposed approach allows a
distinction between research and clinical contexts as well as between different
kinds of research contexts involving genetic information. Most importantly, it
enables the law to take into consideration the context within which we collect
and use genetic information. This reduces the adverse impact on identity
promoted by the current law’s effect on the social meaning of genetic
information.
Part II discusses genetic exceptionalism and several writers’ views about
the risks of genetic exceptionalism, including how genetic exceptionalism

9. Interestingly, federal regulations (“CLIAA”) require that a lab be accredited before any
clinically significant lab results are passed on to the patient. Since most research labs are not
CLIAA approved, the regulation prohibits the passing on of lab results to the patient or research
participant.
10. See Jonathan Kahn, Bringing Dignity Back to Light: Publicity Rights and The Eclipse of
the Tort of Appropriation of Identity, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 213, 214 (1999) [hereinafter
Kahn, Bringing Dignity Back to Light]; Jonathan Kahn, Biotechnology and The Legal
Constitution of the Self: Managing Identity In Science, the Market, and Society, 51 HASTINGS L.J.
909 (2000) [hereinafter Kahn, Biotechnology]. Other commentators advocate using the tort of
intrusion on seclusion to protect individual interests in genetic privacy. See also June Mary Z.
Makdisi, Genetic Privacy: New Intrusion A New Tort, 34 CREIGHTON L. REV. 965 (2001).
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leads to a reductionist view of identity. The section relies on the example of
HIV exceptionalism for guidance. Part III elaborates on the difference
between genetic information in the research and clinical contexts. Part IV
discusses an alternative approach for genetic protection statutes that focuses on
the substance of the genetic information. The proposal centers on a
misappropriation of identity method. Part V offers a conclusion.
PART II - GENETIC EXCEPTIONALISM
“You,” your joys and your sorrows, your memories and your ambitions, your
sense of personal identity and free will, are in fact no more than the
[genetically determined] behavior of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their
associated molecules.11

Francis Crick and James Watson described the double helix structure of
DNA in the early 1950s.12 Fifty years later, many people routinely ascribe
quirks and family traits to “it’s genetic.” Although Crick’s view about the
extent of genetics in forming every aspect of our lives may be exuberant, many
share his view of the power of genetics and its predominance in describing
who and what we are. Legal commentators also describe genetic information
as fundamentally different from other types of personal information.13
Many people are apprehensive about the potential for misuse of genetic
information. Employers or health care insurers may use genetic information to
discriminate against people because their genetic information indicates a
greater risk of disease and expense.14 A national survey in 1997 showed that
two-thirds of respondents would refuse to participate in a genetic test if
employers or health insurers could see the results.15 Greater than eighty
percent of the respondents favored prohibitions against employers or insurers
having access to an individual’s genetic information.16 A genetics counselor at
11. FRANCIS CRICK, THE ASTONISHING HYPOTHESIS: THE SCIENTIFIC SEARCH FOR THE
SOUL 3 (1994).
12. See J.D. Watson & F.H.C. Crick, Genetic Implications of the Structure of
Deoxyribonucleic Acid, 171 NATURE 964 (1953).
13. See, e.g., Lynda M. Fox & Barbara A. Kakenmaster, The Genetic Privacy Act: Proposed
Model Legislation, 24 COLO. LAW. 2317, 2317 (1995). The authors write, “The major premise
underlying the Act is that genetic information is different from other types of personal
information and, thus, requires special protection.” Id.
14. See generally Diver & Cohen, supra note 8. The authors advocate a legal strategy of
“genetic transparency” to “enable our society to confront openly its phobias about genetic
diversity and begin, at last, fully to appreciate its blessings.” Id. at 1482. The authors use an
economic analysis to reach their conclusion, maintaining that the prohibition of all genetic
discrimination, although well-intentioned, would lead to significant welfare losses due to the
“distortion of allocative efficiency.” Id. at 1445.
15. Paul Steven Miller, Genetic Discrimination in the Workplace, 26 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
189, 189 (1998).
16. Id.
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the University of California, Los Angeles (U.C.L.A.), reported that nearly 80%
of people getting a genetic test for Huntington’s disease would rather pay out
of pocket than allow their insurance companies access to the information.17
The dissemination of genetic information might also wreak havoc in other
aspects of a person’s life. For example, a potential spouse may change his or
her mind about marriage or one’s partner may decide against having children
because of the other’s genetic profile. Family and friends may pity, shun or
avoid a person because of what they know, or think they know, about an
individual’s genes.
Others are fearful that genetic information might tell them some
information about themselves that they would rather not know. For example,
they might be told about the high probability of dementia after a certain age, an
incurable disease, or a disease curable only with great suffering, time,
monetary expense and familial burdens. Commentators cite many scenarios in
support of the right not to know.18
Commentators also write about how genetic information is different than
other types of information because it invokes the interests of the family as well
as the individual. They ask about what rights and interests might protect
genetic family members who do not want to know. Some argue that genetic
information is different from family history because of the increased
specificity and reliability of genetic results. When family members retell their
family history, their memories are often inaccurate. They may be misinformed
about what disease a relative had, or they may deny certain family
propensities. Genetic information suffers from none of these human frailties.
It is one thing to know that dementia runs in your family. It is quite another
thing to know that you carry a gene that gives you a 75% chance of developing
dementia by the time you are sixty-five years old.
Whether people view genetic information as more dangerous, more
powerful or more complete, the belief that genetic information is different
from other types of information is ubiquitous. This view has generated
numerous legal commentators to argue that genetic information is
fundamentally different and inherently requires additional protections. For
example, George Annas describes genetic information as “a future diary.”19
Although he admits it is “in code and probabilistic,” Annas argues that
17. Antonio Regalado, Confidential! Genetics Research is Prompting Calls for New Privacy
Laws, WALL ST. J., Feb. 21, 2001, at R10.
18. See, e.g., Richard S. Fedder, To Know or Not to Know: Legal Perspectives on Genetic
Privacy and Disclosure of an Individual’s Genetic Profile, 21 J. LEGAL MED. 557 (2000);
Graeme T. Laurie, Challenging Medical-Legal Norms: The Role of Autonomy, Confidentiality,
and Privacy in Protecting Individual and Familial Group Rights in Genetic Information, 22 J.
LEGAL MED. 1 (2001).
19. George J. Annas, Genetic Privacy: There Ought to Be a Law, 4 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 9,
11 (1999).
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“genetic information should be seen as private because it is in essence a
reverse diary: it informs our younger selves about our aging selves.”20 Many
state21 and federal22 genetic privacy statutes and regulations, as well as pending
20. See id. Professor Annas states, in full:
But you can think about your DNA molecule as a “future diary.” It is in code and
probabilistic, but just as private. It is information about you, information about which you
should have a right not to know, a right to say, “I don’t want to know this.” But even if
you want to know it, you should have a right to say, “I don’t want anybody else to know
it. I don’t want my employer to know it. I don’t want the FBI to know it. I don’t want
my school to know it. I don’t want my colleagues to know it. I don’t want my spouse to
know it. I don’t want my children to know it.”
Id. at 11. Professor Annas emphasizes that it is the fact that we treat genetic information as
different from other types of information that supports special legal protections for genetic
information. He argues that genetic information is different only in the sense that it should
receive special legal protections because it involves three of the four different facets of privacy.
Elsewhere, Professor Annas has also written that the issues raised by the Human Genome Project
are not unique. Rather, they bring issues into focus. Whereas the issues might not be unique for
Annas, he does advocate a property based right in genetic information. See also George J. Annas,
Mapping the Human Genome and the Meaning of Monster Mythology, 39 EMORY L.J. 629, 640
(1990).
21. All states have legislation that restricts access to medical records. As of April 2002,
thirty states had a statute that specifically addressed genetic information. Twenty-three states had
laws requiring informed consent for disclosure of genetic information. Four states defined
genetic information in terms of personal property. National Conference of State Legislatures,
State Genetic Privacy Laws, at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/genetics/prt.htm (last
updated Apr. 15, 2002). Another account claims that at least forty states have statutes that
provide protections for genetic information, although the strength of the protections varies. Janet
L. Dolgin, Personhood, Discrimination, and the New Genetics, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 755, 781
(2001) (indicating that the disparity is partially explained by the pattern of state laws addressing
medical privacy, which has been described as a “ morass” and “erratic.”). See also Andrew A.
Skolnick, Opposition to Law Officers Having Unfettered Access to Medical Records, 279 JAMA
257 (1998); Joy Pritts et al., The State of Health Privacy: An Uneven Terrain: A Comprehensive
Survey of State Health Privacy Statutes (1999), available at http://www.healthprivacy.org/
usr_doc/35309.pdf.
22. See, for example, Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA),
which protects against genetic discrimination and invasion of privacy. Compliance with privacy
concerns is the most important issue heading into 2002 according to an advisory board of health
care attorneys put together by the Health Law Reporter. See M. Alexander Otto & Barbara Yuill,
Privacy Rule Still Dominates Health Practice; Attention Focuses on Bioterrorism Planning, 11
BNA HEALTH L. REP. 5 (2002). Cost estimates for implementation of privacy rules under
HIPAA, published in 2000, were $17.6 billion over ten years. See Proposal Would Lower Price
of Privacy Rule Under Research, Other Provisions, HHS Says, MED. RES. L. & POL’Y REP., Apr.
3, 2002, at 36, 36. Recent proposed revisions of HIPAA’s privacy rule is aimed at reducing
researcher’s burdens. Id. at 37. Other applicable federal laws include the Privacy Act of 1974, 5
U.S.C. § 552 (2000) (applicable to federal agencies); the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42
U.S.C. § 12112 (2000) (requiring confidential employee records); 42 C.F.R. § 482.24(b)(3)
(1999) (Medicare regulations requiring hospitals to ensure confidentiality of medical records);
and the common rule, where the federal regulation for the protection of human subjects in
research places significant oversight with the Institutional Review Boards. See 45 C.F.R. § 46
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legislation,23 provide specific protections for genetic information and view
genetic information as special. For instance, the Oregon Genetic Privacy Act
includes a legislative finding that “genetic information is uniquely private and
personal information.” 24 Statutes like this one protect genetic privacy as a
distinct form of medical information that merits protection separate from the
already existing statutory protections for medical and research information.
These statutes view genetic information as exceptional.
A.

HIV exceptionalism and genetic exceptionalism25

The idea that certain types of information are exceptional is not new. For
example, in the early 1990s, Ronald Bayer described our policy of treating
He termed this “HIV
HIV infection as an exceptional disease.26
(2000). In addition, there is pending federal legislation with ramifications on the use of genetic
information included in one joint resolution, and ten bills in the Senate and House of
Representatives. National Cancer Institute, Genetic Privacy, Discrimination and Medical
Information, at http://www3.cancer.gov/legis/june02/genetic.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2002)
(summarizing the pending legislation).
23. As of May 2002, pending federal legislation with some ramification on the use of genetic
information included one joint resolution (H.R.J. Res. 38), and ten bills in the Senate and House
of Representative. National Cancer Institute, supra note 24.
24. Statutes like Oregon’s revised Genetic Privacy Statute, S. 114, codified at OR. REV.
STAT. § 192.531, do distinguish between anonymous genetic information and other types of
genetic information, but even anonymous genetic information is treated as exceptional and
requires additional steps when a person agrees that their tissue may be used for genetic research.
Commentators have pointed out that genetic information with only limited identifying
information may adversely impact groups as well as individuals, but this is also true for other
types of information such as race. A different approach from the one taken by genetic privacy
statutes of focusing on all genetic information regardless of the substantive effects of the
information, is arguably offered by the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Americans
with Disabilities Act. See Laura F. Rothstein, Genetic Discrimination: Why Bragdon Does Not
Ensure Protection, 3 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 330 (2000). But see EEOC COMPL. MAN. §
902.8 (classifying asymptomatic genetic conditions as disabilities because persons with such
conditions may be regarded as having a disability).
25. Others have looked to the HIV exceptionalism debate to gain insight into genetic
exceptionalism. See Zita Lazzarini, What Lessons We Learn From the Exceptionalism Debate
(Finally)?, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 149 (2001). Lazzarini instructs that
[t]he point is not whether genetic information or HIV should be treated as all other
diseases are treated now, but how should we resolve that period of social negotiation that
inevitably follows new discoveries or threats, and how will that response inform our ways
of dealing with “old” information or threats.
Id. at 150. Lazzarini also asserts that “[a]s a society, we need to assess the real threats to privacy
and dignity that genetics pose.” Id. at 151. I undertake an examination of the real threat of
genetics.
26. Ronald Bayer, Public Health Policy and the AIDS Epidemic: An End to HIV
Exceptionalism? 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1500, 1500-04 (1991) [hereinafter Bayer, Public Health
Policy]. See also Ronald Bayer et al., HIV Antibody Screening: An Ethical Framework for
Evaluating Proposed Programs, 256 JAMA 1768, 1768-74 (1986) [hereinafter Bayer, HIV
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exceptionalism” because our laws and health system treated HIV infection
differently from other diseases.27 Bayer painted the background of a
traditional public health approach, which arose in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century, as a system that emphasized mandatory reporting to public
health registries and compulsory testing.28 HIV, he argued, stands in relief,
emerging as exceptional.29 This is evident by looking at how people were
tested and screened for the disease, how the information was stored, and how
our legal and health care systems implemented protections for the identity of
HIV positive patients. Unlike other infectious diseases, HIV testing required
specific consent, instead of the presumed consent accompanying most blood
tests for infectious diseases.30 The exceptional status of HIV infection is
evident when a New York State court supported the state health commissioner
in refusing to categorize HIV infection as a sexually transmitted and
communicable disease.31
Bayer agreed that the justification for treating HIV infection differently lay
largely in the great potential for stigmatization and discrimination.32
According to Bayer, this civil liberties-sensitive approach was brought about
by the relatively strong political power of gay men.33 One of the reasons for
the declining influence of HIV exceptionalism was the shift in risk of infection
away from homosexual men and toward minority drug users.34 Bayer
remarked, “Not only do black and Hispanic drug users lack the capacity to
influence policy in the way homosexual men have done, but also those who
speak on their behalf often lack the singular commitment to privacy and
consent that so characterized the posture of gay organizations.”35 For Bayer,
HIV exceptionalism was largely a result of political forces.36

Antibody Screening]; Kevin M. De Cock & Anne M. Johnson, From Exceptionalism to
Normalisation: A Reappraisal of Attitudes and Practices Around HIV Testing, 316 BRIT. MED. J.
290-93 (1998).
27. See generally Bayer, Public Health Policy, supra note 26.
28. See Lawrence O. Gostin et al., The Law and Public Health: A Study of Infectious
Disease Law in the United States, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 59 (1999) (insightful article on the law,
public health and infectious disease).
29. Bayer, Public Health Policy, supra note 26, at 1501.
30. Id.
31. N.Y. State Soc’y of Surgeons v. Axelrod, 572 N.E.2d 605, 607 (N.Y. 1991).
32. See Bayer, HIV Antibody Screening, supra note 26, at 1768.
33. Bayer, Public Health Policy, supra note 26, at 1503.
34. Id.
35. Id. Bayer notes other reasons for the end of HIV exceptionalism. These include the
existence of more effective drugs for the treatment of HIV and the clinical understanding of the
benefits of early treatment. See Ronald Bayer, Clinical Progress and the Future of HIV
Exceptionalism, 159 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 1042 (1999).
36. Bayer, Public Health Policy, supra note 26, at 1502.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

432

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 47:423

Bayer’s objection to HIV exceptionalism was that it interfered with our
ability to best prevent new infections and diagnose current ones.37 He
described recent trends with relief: “[T]he first decade of the epidemic came to
an end, public health officials began to assert their professional dominance
over the policy-making process and in so doing began to rediscover the
relevance of their own professional traditions to the control of AIDS.”38 In
Bayer’s view, HIV exceptionalism was problematic because it represented a
politically driven change in the social meaning of AIDS that had deleterious
effects on the public health system’s ability to effectively contain and treat the
disease.39
How did HIV exceptionalism change the social meaning of the disease?
The social meaning of “being HIV positive” was fundamentally different from
“having syphilis” or “having heart disease.” The difference in description of
“having” verses “being” illustrates how HIV infection consumed an
individual’s identity to a greater degree. By categorizing HIV as exceptional,
the social meaning of HIV infection took away some of the individual’s ability
to define his or her own identity. No matter what, once infected with HIV,
people thought of themselves and were considered by others, HIV positive.
Presumably, it was worse to be HIV positive than to be just about anything
else, in part, because of the certainty of death in the relatively near future and,
in part, because of the great risk of discrimination. It made sense that the legal
protections for individuals with HIV should be stronger because of what it
meant to be HIV positive. However, in doing so, the legal protections also
impacted what it meant to be HIV positive.
More recently, Friedman Ross compared HIV with genetic information to
address whether genetic information is exceptional.40 She began with the
proposition that HIV infection is not exceptional, as shown by the present day
She then examined whether
“normalization of HIV management.”41
differences between genetic information and HIV infection succeed in setting
the former apart.42 She discussed various attributes, including the potential for
eugenics, the impact on family, and the probabilistic character of genetics.43
Ross concluded that genetic information is not exceptional, relying on her
analysis of the attributes mentioned, as well as on Gostin and Hodges, who

37. Id.
38. Id. at 1502.
39. Id. at 1503-04.
40. Lainie Friedman Ross, Genetic Exceptionalism vs. Paradigm Shift: Lessons from HIV,
29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 141, 141 (2001).
41. Id. at 141-42.
42. Id. at 142-43.
43. Id. at 143.
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argue against genetic exceptionalism largely on the basis of how closely
genetic information melds with other medical information.44
Interestingly, Ross seeks the answer to whether genetic information is
objectively different from HIV infection and other kinds of information, while
implicitly assuming that we know.45 Ross argues that if genetic information is
not different, we should not treat it as exceptional.46 One problem is that in
many ways genetic information does seem different. Powerful techniques are
associated with genetic information. From a cheek swab, a person’s entire
genetic sequence might be generated, with great amounts of potential and
predictive information about the individual’s future and her family, including
children not yet conceived.
Scott Burris offers a different approach to the exceptionalism debate in his
critique of Bayer.47 His insightful conclusion is that society and the law’s
treatment of HIV is both similar and fundamentally different.48 Burris argues
that we never treated HIV differently.49 Descriptions of HIV as exceptional
rely on sentimental and inaccurate views of the past.50 According to Burris,
the “norm” that HIV must contrast against in order to attain exceptional status
never existed.51 Instead, HIV appears much like other “killer diseases of the
past,” and is similar to other politicized diseases like syphilis, tuberculosis and
cholera.52
Burris argues the political, public health and societal reaction to HIV is
part of a paradigm shift. The shift is toward a paradigm that places an
emphasis on reducing the fear and stigma from certain “killer diseases.” In the
past, fear and stigma have stood in the way of more effective disease control.
In contrast, our recent collective reaction to HIV and AIDS represents a
movement to lessen the harmful effects of the fear and stigma as well as
allowing more effective public health control of the disease itself. For
example, many people expressed concern early on in the AIDS story about
potentially infected patients who did not seek testing because they were
worried about the possible effects of a publicized positive test result or even
dissemination of the information that they had simply sought out a screening
test for HIV. Increasing consent and confidentiality requirements lessened the

44. Gostin & Hodge, supra note 6, at 21.
45. Ross, supra note 40, at 142-43.
46. Id. at 145.
47. See Scott Burris, Public Health, “AIDS Exceptionalism” and the Law, 27 J. MARSHALL
L. REV. 251 (1994) [hereinafter Burris, Public Health]; Scott Burris, Law and the Social Risk of
Health Care: Lessons form HIV Testing, 61 ALB. L. REV. 831 (1998).
48. Burris, Public Health, supra note 47, at 255.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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fear and made it easier to treat and potentially prevent HIV. Burris concludes
by stating that HIV was never exceptional. Instead, HIV represents a different
and better approach to the way that law, medicine, and public health treat
disease that threatens distinct groups and becomes inevitably politicized. For
Burris, HIV is “unique but not exceptional.”53
Although Burris and Bayer reach different conclusions about the benefit of
HIV “exceptionalism” or “uniqueness,” they both use the effectiveness of the
public health system to control and treat the disease as the bellwether for their
conclusions. However, Burris takes the argument a step further by considering
the meaning of our belief that we treated HIV infection differently.
Burris’ approach teaches us to ask not whether genetic information
represents a new and exceptional threat to privacy, but to use the question, “Is
genetic information exceptional?” as a starting point. We should, instead, ask
the more informative question of what it means that many people, including
many legislators and some judges, believe that genetic information is
exceptional. Answering this question gives insight as to what might be a better
legal approach for the protection of genetic information.
B.

The Social Meaning Of Genetic Exceptionalism

The anthropologist Kaja Finkler describes today’s world of “gene
hegemony,” writing:
[E]verything about an organism’s existence is predetermined and genetically
programmed, including its variation, although geneticists recognize that the
program may be affected by unknown and external factors in the environment,
chance, or human manipulation. The sequence of our DNA reveals to us who
and what we are; that is, what it means to be human. With DNA sequencing,
some scientists have maintained that the riddle of life is close to being
solved.54

The belief in the gene and belief in biological determinism go hand in hand.
Perhaps it is the neatness of this fit that appeals to many people. Dorothy
Nelkin and M. Susan Lindee expand on the widespread and profound effect of
our belief in DNA. They describe a change in the social meaning of DNA:
Just as the Christian soul has provided an archetypal concept through which to
understand the person and continuity of self, so DNA appears in popular
culture as a soul-like entity, a holy and immortal relic, a forbidden territory.
The similarity between the powers of DNA and those of the Christian soul, we
suggest, is more than linguistic or metaphorical. DNA has taken on the social

53. Burris, Public Health, supra note 47, at 261.
54. KAJA FINKLER, EXPERIENCING THE NEW GENETICS: FAMILY AND KINSHIP ON THE
MEDICAL FRONTIER 48 (2000).
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and cultural functions of the soul. It is the essential entity—the location of the
true self—in the narratives of biological determinism.55

Nelkin and Lindee illustrate the dangerousness and divisiveness of the cultural
importance we have given the gene. The gene is powerful and deterministic.
Nelkin and Lindee write, “[G]enetic explanations . . . construct difference as
central to identity [and] definition of the self.”56 Differences attributed to
genetic causes are powerful because they are immutable. An individual’s
genes, unlike behavior, cannot change during an individual’s lifetime. Genetic
explanations emphasize and formalize differences. Placing the causes for our
differences within our DNA means that efforts to change our thinking and
social programs to promote changes in attitudes are unlikely to bring effective
changes because they will not eliminate genetically caused behavioral traits.
Not only do Nelkin and Lindee discuss the importance of genetic
information in constructing our identity, but they also catalogue some of the
results of genetic essentialism. They note how genetic essentialism appeals to
those who want to emphasize individual responsibility and reduce
governmental and societal responsibility for improving social conditions.57
Although notions of the intrinsically individualistic character of each person’s
unique DNA supports individual responsibility, the idea that behavior is
predominantly influenced by genetic factors leads to the rhetoric of the futility
of improving social conditions.
This is the paradoxical element of genetic essentialism, which while
fostering notions of individual responsibility, simultaneously undermines
belief in autonomy.58 Biologically determined actions are often excused, since
they are apart from freely chosen actions.59 The emphasis on the gene as the
determinate force in our individual character leads to abolition of individual
blame and responsibility.60 Instead, responsibility shifts to the individual’s
genetic family.61
Finkler explored the shift from more traditional notions of family based on
a complex network of obligations and a tradition to the genetic family’s

55. DOROTHY NELKIN & M. SUSAN LINDEE, THE DNA MYSTIQUE: THE GENE AS A
CULTURAL ICON 41-42 (1995).
56. Id. at 126.
57. The explanation for behavior lies in the individual DNA and there can be little collective
responsibility for behavior caused by such a personal and individualistic source. Id. at 129.
Social programs to improve living conditions are futile if personal attributes are not due to the
interaction between one’s environment and one’s choices, but due to one’s genetic makeup.
Nelkin and Lindee provide examples stories in the popular press of individuals with “good genes”
who transcend the difficult environment in which they grow up. See id. at 94-101.
58. See NELKIN & LINDEE, supra note 55, at 129.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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emphasis on shared DNA alone.62 Finkler writes, “To sense that one forms
part of a family chiefly because one shares the same genes, requiring no social
participation nor sense of responsibility to those who are related except to
provide blood samples for testing purposes, removes the moral context of
family relationships.”63 Similarly, Janet Dolgin shows how the construction of
a “genetic family” is evolving, and she urges us to proceed carefully when
considering how we will allow genetic information to change our views about
personhood and the nature of our relationships. Dolgin sees the genetic family
as a threat:
The genetic family . . . is defined exclusively with reference to a genome. In
consequence, the locus of social value shifts from the individual to groups of
apparently fungible individuals, and the autonomous individual constructed
through, and understood in terms of, Enlightenment values, ceases to be
essential. Moreover, the view that genes are shared substance and information
facilitates depersonalization. . . . A universe predicated on the notion of a
genetic group would view the preservation of autonomy, and the protection of
the individual, with indifference.64

And, later on, she concludes that central to the “emerging ideological
construct” of the “genetic family” is “the obliteration of privacy,” within the
genetic family because the individuals are indistinguishable.65
The courts provide an example of this shift toward a genetic family. A
New Jersey Superior Court decision in Safer v. Estate of Pack66 shows the
expanding role of the idea of the genetic family and its potential threat to
individual privacy and autonomy. In Safer, the court expanded the scope of a
physician’s duty to warn about increased risk for cancer to include family
members if one family member is diagnosed with a cancer that has a hereditary
component.67 Donna Safer, the daughter of a man who died twenty-six years
earlier, sued her father’s doctor for failing to inform her of her increased risk of
colon cancer.68 Since her cancer was the hereditary form, Donna Safer’s risk
of colon cancer was increased (most colon cancer is not hereditary in this
sense). The New Jersey Superior Court found a duty to warn that extended to
family members who were not the doctor’s patients, by stating, “Further, it is
appropriate . . . that the duty be seen as owed not only to the patient himself
but that it also ‘extend[s] beyond the interests of the patient to members of the
immediate family of the patient who may be adversely affected by a breach of

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

FINKLER, supra note 54, at 48.
Id.
Dolgin, supra note 21, at 801.
Id. at 813.
291 A.2d 1188 (1996).
Id. at 1191-1192.
Id. at 1190.
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that duty.’”69 The decision treated the patient/father with the hereditary form
of colon cancer as primarily a member of a genetic family. The court focused
on the daughter’s status as a member of the same genetic family as her father
to expand the physician’s duty to inform to a person with whom the doctor has
no patient-doctor relationship. Presumably, according to Safer, when a doctor
now takes on a new patient, the doctor is also creating a doctor-patient
relationship with the patient’s entire genetic family.
This example illustrates how genetic information can limit not only the
autonomy of the patient with colon cancer, but may also limit the individual
autonomy of a family member who might not want to know that they have the
“gene for colon cancer.”70 What if, in the example provided by Safer, the
daughter did not want to know? Although most people may want to know
about an increased risk of hereditary colon cancer because of available and
effective screening methods, the problem is more apparent if the disease is one
like Huntington’s or Alzheimer’s disease. A family member may not want to
know about a disease whose onset is still years away and for which there is no
effective treatment.71 Arguably, such genetic information may profoundly
impact an individual’s identity. It may also limit individual choices by overly
weighting one side of a decision, such as a decision about whether to have
children.
This broad effect of genetic information is central to the problem. Genetic
information implicates and potentially infringes autonomy rights whether the
law expands the right to know to family members, as in Safer, or whether it
shields genetic privacy.72 The crux of the issue, and the point made by Dolgin,
69. Id. at 1192 (quoting Schroeder v. Perkel, 57 N.J. 53, 65, 432 A.2d 834 (1981)) (alteration
in original).
70. Most colon cancers, and most human cancers, are not genetic in the sense that they are
passed from one generation to the next. Cancers are genetic in the sense that they are caused by
genetic mutations, but current understanding is that the genetic mutations giving rise to most
cancer are not passed from parent to child. Instead, most cancers are caused by a series of genetic
mutations that accumulate over time and survive in a population of cells that grows into a cancer.
For example, most colon cancer arises in older people and involves a series of genetic mishaps.
Genetic mutations are relatively common and there is a risk for a mutation every time a cell
divides. Most of the mutations are caught by the cell’s machinery and either fixed or the cell is
killed or dies. Over time, the risk that these safety mechanisms fail increases, partially explaining
that many cancers are more common in older persons. See generally RAMZI S. COTRAN ET AL.,
ROBBINS PATHOLOGIC BASIS OF DISEASE (6th ed. 1999).
71. See MATT RIDLEY, GENOME: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THE SPECIES IN 23 CHAPTERS
63 (1999). Some estimate that only 20% of people would chose to know their fate if they could.
Id.
72. The court in Safer recognized the potential conflict, stating, “It may be necessary, at
some stage, to resolve a conflict between the physician’s broader duty to warn and his fidelity to
an expressed preference of the patient that nothing be said to family members about the details of
the disease.” Safer, 677 A.2d at 1192-93. The same predicament occurs within the setting of
genetic research, where an individual who chooses not to participate may be affected by
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is that the profound shift in the social meaning of genetic information occurs
once decision makers begin balancing the interests of the individual with the
diagnosed genetic attribute against the interests of genetic family members.73
Although the genetic family members may or may not have the genetic
attribute, the decision maker values both groups (the person with the genetic
attribute and that person’s family members) similarly because the decision
maker has elevated genetic information to an essential defining attribute.
Genetic information begins to define us at the point where the focus is on the
genetic character of the information rather than on the individual and his or her
right to make a decision within the setting of traditional familial
responsibilities and relationships.
In Safer, the court allowed the genetic character of the information to
change the meaning of the patient-doctor relationship and the daughter-father
relationship. Why should not the law respect the confidentiality of the patientdoctor relationship and leave it up to family members to share the information
if they choose? If a doctor diagnoses a patient with syphilis, the general rule is
that the doctor is under no obligation to tell the patient’s spouse.74 Why should
the fact that the information is genetic change the legal responsibilities of
keeping medical information confidential?
Genetic information begins to define who we are when we look primarily
at the fact that information is genetic rather than look at the substance of the
genetic information. Similar to the example of “being HIV positive,” we view

information derived from genetic family members. See Henry T. Greely, The Control of Genetic
Research Involving the “Groups Between,” 33 HOUS. L. REV. 1397, 1411 (1997).
73. This balancing approach is used by The American Society of Human Genetics in their
official statement about Professional Disclosure of Familial Genetic Information. Am. Soc’y of
Human Genetics Subcommittee on Familial Disclosure, ASHG Statement: Professional
Disclosure of Familial Genetic Information, 62 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 474 (1998). The
statement notes the case law established by Tarasoff v Regents of the University of California,
551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976), placing a general duty on third parties for foreseeable, serious and
identifiable risks. Id. The statement also notes that foreign bodies, such as the World Health
Organization and others, support limited disclosure to at-risk relatives provided the harm is grave
and imminent and effective intervention is available. The statement summary includes the
following, “Moreover, where the harm is serious . . . and likely, and where prevention or
treatment is available, the health-care professional may have a privilege to warn at risk relatives,
irrespective of the patient’s wishes.” Id. at 476 (emphasis added).
74. See generally Judy E. Zelin, Physician’s Tort Liability for Unauthorized disclosure of
Confidential Information About Patient, 48 A.L.R. 4th 668 (1986) (discussing unauthorized
disclosure by a physician of confidential information). Various theories exist, including invasion
of privacy, breach of the confidential doctor-patient relationship and malpractice. A physician’s
obligation to reveal confidential information to warn a third party was recognized in Tarasoff v.
Regents of the University of California, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976). The case involved a
psychotherapist whose patient killed Tarasoff. The court restricted the duty to a foreseeable,
serious injury to a reasonably identifiable victim. Id. at 342. The rule for psychotherapists is
codified in CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.92 (West 1997).
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genetic traits as powerfully defining who an individual is, overriding the ability
of individuals to treat genetic information as one piece of information to which
we are able to give differing degrees of value and meaning. Rather than
allowing individuals to define themselves, we begin to allow genetic
information to define the individuals. In other words, a person’s genetic
information that his or her eyes are green should be no different than other
information that verifies the green color of his or her eyes, like a photograph of
the person’s eyes or a testimonial that his or her eyes are green. The law
should protect this information if it is in a medical record because the law
protects confidential information but not solely because the information is
genetic. In certain situations, the use of a photograph depicting someone is
legally protected. Similar standards might be used to protect information that is
genetic, as I will discuss.
PART III - THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE CLINICAL AND RESEARCH
CONTEXTS OF GENETIC INFORMATION
A.

The Importance of Context in Genetic Information

Genetic privacy statutes create a protective area around our genetic
information. Many of these statutes extend the zone of privacy around genetic
families, which, as discussed above, concomitantly weakens the protections
around individuals.75 Moreover, many genetic privacy statutes fail to
adequately recognize the importance of context.76 These statutes do not
adequately distinguish between the research and clinical contexts, between
different kinds of research, and whether genetic information is collected in
medical or employment settings. Interestingly, many statutes implicitly
recognize context by creating exceptions for genetic information collected for
the government’s benefit, reducing the strength of the genetic protections for
individuals when the information is collected and used by the state.
Although most genetic privacy statutes distinguish between genetic
information that is easily linked to an identifiable individual and anonymous
75. For example, the Oregon Genetic Privacy Act explicitly extends its protections to
include not only the individual but also the individual’s genetic family. Oregon’s Senate Bill
114, codified at OR. REV. STAT. § 192.531 (2001), passed into law and effective beginning
January 2001, contains the legislative finding that “an analysis of an individual’s DNA provides
information not only about the individual, but also about blood relatives of the individual, with
the potential for impacting family privacy, including reproductive decisions.” Id.
76. See, e.g., S. B. 114, 71st Leg. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2001). The bill does create
different categories of genetic information depending on the degree to which the genetic
information can be linked to a particular individual. Nevertheless, the statute mandates that
individuals be notified that their genetic material is used for research even if the genetic
information is completely anonymous (it is impossible to link the information to the individual).
Id.
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genetic information, the focus of the protective scheme remains on the genetic
information and not on the context. The distinction between linked and
anonymous genetic information is different from recognizing context because
the distinction makes no attempt to consider the substantive quality of the
genetic information.
The failure to recognize the contexts within which researchers uncover
genetic information elevates genetic information to an “essential entity” and
distorts the meaning of identity by placing too much value on the genetic
character of information, instead of looking at how the substantive information
might impact individual identity. Ironically, protecting all genetic information
just because it is somehow derived from DNA brings us closer to the harms
Nelkin, Lindee, Finkler and others warn against, and brings us closer to
formalizing the kind of “we are nothing more than our genetics” view
promoted by Crick. Legal protections of genetic information should recognize
that genetic information obtained in the research context may not have the
same impact as genetic information within clinical contexts. Legal protections
should also acknowledge that not all research is the same. The legal
protections should incorporate an understanding that different kinds of research
involve different kinds of individual interests in genetic information.
Legal protections for genetic information in the clinical setting make sense
for the same reasons that legal protections exist for other confidential medical
information; there is significant risk that such information might lead to
discrimination or adversely impact individual autonomy, privacy or identity.
The distinction between genetic and non-genetic information is often
difficult.77 However, if the law effectively protects all important confidential
medical information in the clinical setting, there is little need to distinguish
between genetic and non-genetic information, at least for the purposes of
protecting privacy and autonomy. Admittedly, the legal protections for
confidential medical information are not as strong and effective as they might
be. Notwithstanding these deficiencies, implementation of stronger protections
for the difficult to define category of genetic information will not strengthen
the confidentiality protections of other medical information.78

77. See Gostin & Hodge, supra note 6, at 21 (arguing against genetic exceptionalism on
various grounds including the inherent difficulty in distinguishing between genetic and nongenetic medical information). See also Diver & Cohen, supra note 8, at 1451 (discussing the
difficulty in defining what sources comprise legally protected genetic information, and noting that
medical history and direct observations can divulge much genetic information).
78. See Gostin & Hodge, supra note 6, at 23. The authors point out that laws emphasizing
the difference between genetic information and other kinds of health information foster genetic
exceptionalism, which they do not think is appropriate for a number of reasons. Id. One reason
is that it is “unfair to persons with non-genetic conditions by excluding them from the protection
of private interests which they would otherwise be entitled if their condition has a genetic origin.”
Id. at 23-24.
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The legislative failure to distinguish between the research and clinical
contexts, and between different kinds of research, reflects a lack of
understanding about the kinds of genetic information research typically
involves. A brief explanation of the different contexts might lend clarity to the
argument advocating such distinctions.
B.

Tissue in the Bank

There is a difference between research on tissue used primarily by
physicians for routine diagnostic and therapeutic purposes and research done
by researchers on tissue removed explicitly as part of prospective clinical
trials. Tissue removed as biopsy tissue, or as part of a therapeutic operative
procedure, like taking out a segment of colon for colon cancer, is used
primarily for therapy and diagnosis. Typically, a pathologist looks at this
tissue and gives either an initial diagnosis or confirms an existing one. After
the removed tissue serves its diagnostic or therapeutic purpose, a laboratory
routinely stores the tissue or parts of the tissue. One can think of this tissue as
“banked,” held safely for possible future use. Occasionally, researchers return
to this “banked” tissue to conduct studies to learn about a certain disease,
particularly cancer. They may perform tests uncovering genetic information.79
As a part of these tests, researchers may de-identify the information in an effort
to protect patient confidentiality. They would give the tissue and the
accompanying clinical information a number with access limited to a few
researchers.
In contrast, researchers in prospective clinical research take tissue for the
primary purpose of doing research on the tissue, although oftentimes, the
sample of tissue also serves diagnostic purposes. Notwithstanding, in many
cases, this tissue would not be removed if not for the research. Subjects in this
kind of research give specific informed consent. An Institutional Review
Board typically reviews this kind of research to ensure that the research is
generally worthwhile and that research subjects are adequately protected. An
obvious potential conflict exists for the physician involved in this kind of

79. See Ellen Wright Clayton et al., Informed Consent for Genetic Research on Stored
Tissue Samples, 274 JAMA 1786 (1995) (consensus statement); Karl T. Kelsey, Informed
Consent for Genetic Research, 275 JAMA 1085 (1996) (voicing concern that consent
requirements for research use of stored tissue will cause a reduction in the numbers of samples
available for research); Wayne W. Grody, Molecular Pathology, Informed Consent, and the
Paraffin Block, 4 DIAGNOSTIC MOLECULAR PATHOLOGY 155 (1995) (voicing concern that
consent requirements for research use of stored tissue will cause a reduction in the numbers of
samples available for research); Rebecca D. Pentz et al., Research Letter: Informed Consent for
Tissue Research, 282 JAMA 1625 (1999) (finding no reduction in accrual of tissue samples after
adding two questions to the informed consent; one specifying that the tissue will be banked and
the other asking whether the patient would want to be informed if the research uncovers any
medically useful information).
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research because it takes place in a clinical setting.80 The doctor has an interest
in the research, yet must maintain his obligations as the research subject’s
physician. A recent Harris pole concluded that only about one-third of adults
in the United States are “very confident” that patients in clinical trials receive
“very good” medical care, although more than 80% of the poll respondents
believed that such trials were “essential” or “very important.”81 An example of
prospective clinical research trials is testing of a new drug to treat leukemia. A
researcher divides a group of people who have a particular type of leukemia
into two groups. Researchers/physicians collect blood samples and bone
marrow biopsies and perform various imaging studies to measure the disease
course. Researchers perform various tests, including genetic tests, on the
collected samples.
Not all genetic information is the same, even within the same research
protocol. Some of the collected genetic information, such as whether a patient
has a subtype of the disease associated with a worse or better prognosis might
reasonably impact patients and might be used by third parties to the detriment,
or benefit, of the patient. Other genetic information, such as identification of a
section of DNA encoding a protein not previously associated with the type of
leukemia, would not reasonably impact clinical outcome or serve any clinical
purpose because too little is known about the protein. Third party insurers or
employers would be unlikely to use this information, since they would not
know what it means. The legal safeguards in these different scenarios should
recognize the different contexts to closely correlate the degree of legal
protections with the degree of risk to an individual being harmed by
dissemination of genetic information.
The differences between prospective clinical research and retrospective
research on banked tissue collected in the usual course of medical care are
important. First, the informed consent requirements differ. In the tissue bank
case, the principal reason for the invasive procedure is therapeutic or
diagnostic with the primary benefit hopefully flowing to the patient. The
patient gives informed consent for the invasive biopsy or operation knowing
that there is a direct therapeutic benefit. Informed consent may require that the
physician inform the patient of the possibility of research on the removed
tissue, but the primary purpose of the procedure remains therapeutic or
diagnostic. In the past, informed consent likely did not include an explicit
statement that genetic research might be done, since genetic research fell under
the more general category of research, which is included in the informed

80. See Frances H. Miller, Trusting Doctors: Tricky Business When It Comes to Clinical
Research, 81 B.U. L. REV. 423 (2001) (part of a symposium about Trust Relationships).
81. See Public Uneasiness About Patient Care in Clinical Trials Revealed in Harris Poll, 1
MED RES. L. & POL’Y 48, 49 (2002).
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consent.82 Prospective research, in contrast, is unlikely to produce any direct
benefit to the patient or research subject. The principles of informed consent
require that the patient explicitly consent to the use of their tissue for relatively
well-defined research purposes. Specific informed consent is essential because
the patient would not undergo an invasive procedure if not for the research.
This is one way in which research on previously banked tissue is
fundamentally different from prospective research where small amounts of
tissue are taken only for research purposes.
Another difference lies in tradition. In the United States and England,
tissue removed for diagnostic purposes following the patient’s informed
consent for an invasive procedure was historically available for research once
the diagnostic purposes of the tissue were fulfilled.83 It was considered
potential waste84 and property of the hospital or pathology laboratory.85 For

82. Admittedly, tissue-banked retrospective research potentially effects patient interests if it
uncovers relevant clinical information. However, federal regulations do not allow the release of
clinically relevant results unless it is from an accredited clinical laboratory and most research labs
are not clinical labs. See William Grizzle et al., Recommended Policies for Uses of Human Tissue
in Research, Education and Quality Control, 123 ARCH. PATHOLOGY & LABORATORY MED.
296, 297 (1999); Genetic Testing Under the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments, 65
Fed. Reg. 25,928-34 (May 4, 2000).
83. See Peter N. Furness, Research Using Human Tissue—A Crisis of Supply?, 195 J.
PATHOLOGY 277, 277 (2001). Furness refers to the Nuffield Council of Bioethics in 1995, which
concluded that it was reasonable to believe that patients have abandoned their tissue once they
have consented to its removal for diagnostic or therapeutic purposes. Id.
84. See Julia D. Mahoney, The Market For Human Tissue, 86 VA. L. REV. 163 (2000)
(discussing the need to recognize the ubiquity of commercial activity in transfers of human tissue
in order to evaluate and better regulate the activity, particularly as new uses are uncovered with
advancing biotechnology). Mahoney writes, “[U]ntil the medical advances of the past century,
however, human tissue from a living body was of use, almost exclusively to its original
possessor.” Id. at 170.
85. See Jonathan I. Epstein, Pathologists and the Judicial Process: How to Avoid it, 25 AM.
J. SURGICAL PATHOLOGY 527 (2001). A “Letter to the Editor” from a physician in Argentina
expressed surprise at Epstein’s statement that tissue received for diagnostic purposes does not
belong to the patient. The Argentinean doctor wrote that in Argentina such tissue belongs to the
patient, since the patient paid for the work done on the tissue. Richard Drut, Letter to the Editor,
Who is the Owner of the Slides, Blocks and Fixed Tissues?, 26 AM. J. SURGICAL PATHOLOGY
274, 274 (2002) (citing Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 271 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1990);
Cornelio v. Stamford Hosp., 717 A.2d 140 (Conn. 1998)). Jonathan I. Epstein & Richard
Kidwell, Authors’ Reply, Who Is the Owner of the Slides, Blocks, and Fixed Tissues, 26 AM. J.
SURGICAL PATHOLOGY 274, 274 (2002). The authors, a pathologist and a lawyer, interpret
Cornelio as holding that the patient “possessed no property right in her cells, contained in pap
smear specimen slides.” Id. They point out that the lower court found that the patient did not
expect to retain possession of the cells after their removal and that the pap smears constituted part
of the medical record. Id. Issues that Epstein and Kidwell do not discuss include what if the
patient does have an expectation of retaining a right, such as a privacy right, in the cells or tissue?
Possession does not necessarily include every stick in the bundle of property rights and as public
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example, a patient consented to having a lung tumor removed. After the
surgeon and the pathologist examine the tissue, the tissue is stored as required
by federal law.86 Researchers may then use the stored tissue for research on
lung tumors.
The often-cited case, Moore v. Regents of the University of California,
affirmed that the patient did not retain a property right in tissue or cells
removed for diagnostic or therapeutic purposes.87 The precise parameters of
informed consent in cases like Moore, which involve tissue removed for
diagnostic or therapeutic purposes and the subsequent commercial benefit for
the physician or researcher, remain problematic. Until recently, most
pathology departments in the United States never questioned whether there
might be any problem with doing research on bits of tissue retained after the
tissue had served its diagnostic utility.
Recently, however, pathology departments now understand that in many
cases approval by the Institutional Review Board is required before anyone
conducts research on banked tissue even though this kind of research is not
“clinical research” in the sense of the traditional prospective clinical trial.
This relatively recent shift in the practice and understanding of
pathologists and researchers is largely the result of heightened legal, public and
institutional awareness about the special concerns regarding genetic
information. In Oregon, for example, the Oregon Privacy Act requires that
patients provide their specific informed consent for genetic research done on
their tissue samples unless the research is anonymous research.88 If the
expectations and understanding changes (improves?), so too might the outcome of a case like
Cornelio.
86. One federal regulation requires that a clinical laboratory “retain stained slides at least ten
years from the date of examination and retain specimen blocks at least two years from the date of
examination.” 42 C.F.R. § 493.1259(b) (2002). The slides referred to are glass slides upon
which thinly cut sections of tissue are placed and stained. A pathologist looks at these under a
microscope to give a diagnosis. The tissue comes from the specimen blocks, which contain the
biopsy tissue or portions of a tumor removed.
87. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990) (recall that the final
holding in the case was about the fiduciary aspect of the patient-doctor relationship and what this
meant in the context of the physician fulfilling her obligations to the patient while obtaining
informed consent); Christopher Scott Pennisi, Note, More on Moore: A Novel Strategy for
Compensating the Human Sources of Patentable Cell-Line Inventions Based on Existing Law, 11
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 747 (2001) (exploring some of the property aspects
of Moore and proposing the shop rights doctrine; recommending changing informed consent so
that patients retain interests in inventions derived from their tissue); William Boulier, Note,
Sperm, Spleens, and Other Valuables: The Need to Recognize Property Rights in Human Body
Parts, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 693 (1995).
88. OR. REV. STAT. § 192.531 (2001) (defining anonymous research as “research conducted
in such a manner that the identity of an individual who has provided a sample, or the identity of
an individual from whom genetic information has been obtained or the identity of the individual’s
blood relatives, cannot be determined”).
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research will be anonymous (individual identity cannot be determined), the
statute requires that someone notify patients that their tissue may be used for
anonymous genetic research. In addition, the patient or research subject may
request that the tissue sample not be used for anonymous research.89
This heightened awareness of researchers and the general public signifies a
change in the social meaning of genetic information. Resulting in part from
regulations and statutes, the heightened awareness of the special character of
genetic information and the apparent increased privacy safeguards are changes
in the right direction. However, a better understanding of genetic research
might help protect individual identity without moving toward genetic
essentialism and expanding, as Kaja Finkler would say, genetic hegemony.
C. Informed Consent Is an Awkward Fit for Genetic Information in the
Context of Retrospective Research on Banked Tissue
Genetic information in the clinical context is governed by pre-existing
theories for informed consent and general confidentiality requirements. For
example, the typical informed consent for a clinical genetic test would involve
someone telling the patient about the risks of the invasive procedure, the
meaning of the genetic test results, including the disease for which the genetic
assay is testing, and about alternatives other than the test. The patient may
visit with a genetic counselor who may discuss a variety of additional issues,
including the impact on family members. Similarly, for prospective research,
the research subjects will be required to give informed consent before the
research project begins because investigators will have an idea about what the
genetic test is looking for. For prospective research, however, the researchers
will not have a good understanding of what the results of a genetic assay will
mean because a better understanding of, for example, expression of a particular
gene and its relationship to disease is exactly what the research is trying to
clarify.
In retrospective research, the patient or research subject cannot give true
informed consent for specific research at the time their tissue is removed
because, typically, there will be little information about the research. New

Federal regulations also distinguish between anonymous tissue samples and identified
samples. Distinctions are made between anonymous, signifying that no identification was ever
attached, and made anonymous, signifying that any link between identity and the tissue is
irreversibly removed. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(f)(2) (2001).
89. OR. REV. STAT. § 192.537(2)(a) (2001) (“A person may use an individual’s DNA sample
or genetic information for anonymous research only if the individual was notified the sample or
genetic information may be used for anonymous research and the individual did not, at the time
of notification, request that the sample not be used for anonymous research.”); OR. REV. STAT. §
192.53 (2001) (the required informed consent for genetic information is different from what the
statute terms “blanket informed consent” because the informed consent required for genetic
research must specify that the tissue sample might be involved in genetic research).
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techniques and new hot research topics arise in the time between tissue
procurement and the initiation of research. Often at the time the patient gives
informed consent for tissue removal, the diagnosis is not known. Therefore, at
the time of consent neither the patient nor the researcher will know basic facts
about the research (for example, does the research involve benign or malignant
tissue?). For these reasons, it is more appropriate that patients or research
subjects in the setting of retrospective research give their authorization for the
future use of their tissue for possible and unspecified genetic research rather
than their informed consent. This is recognized by the various state and
federal privacy rules that require authorization for possible future use of
patients’ tissue. These provisions recognize the poor fit between traditional
theories of informed consent and retrospective research on banked tissue.90
Another advantage of the authorization approach is that it allows patients or
potential research subjects the chance to change their minds. Once they have
given authorization and are aware that their tissue might be used for genetic
research, they can return to the institution and withdraw their authorization for
subsequent research.91
Another reason for this poor fit is that typically the primary reason for the
invasive procedure is therapeutic or diagnostic. Patients are likely focused on
this primary reason rather than the secondary chance that some yet unidentified
researcher may do research on the tissue. Even if the consent could be specific
enough to be informed, the patient giving consent may not fully understand the
scope of their consent regarding possible future research. An alternative is that
the law could require researchers to go back to patients for specific consent for
well-characterized research. However, this approach would be onerous
because of the difficulties and expense of tracking down patients years after
the biopsy or operation.
Despite the practical difficulties with using informed consent to authorize
retrospective research on banked tissue, the underlying purpose of informed
90. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) regulations
endorsed by President Clinton and President Bush include requirements that research subjects
sign an authorization statement for the use and disclosure of their private medical information.
The HIPAA requirements for valid authorization include a specific and meaningful description of
the information, an expiration date and a statement that the patient or research subject has a right
to revoke authorization. See George J. Annas, Medical Privacy and Medical Research—Judging
the New Federal Regulations, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 216 (2002) (citing Standards for Privacy of
Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 82,462 (Dec. 28, 2000)). In a response
to a letter to the editor, Annas noted that the Bush administration may modify the privacy rules
and that the Department of Health and Human Services invited comments on some of the privacy
rules. See George J. Annas, Author’s Reply, Medical Privacy and Medical Research, 346 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1674, 1674 (2002).
91. This may become problematic when human tissue is transferred to other research
institutions and biotechnology companies. See Mahoney, supra note 84, at 167-96 (discussing
the ubiquity of commercial dealings involving human tissue and the issues raised).
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consent (to protect patient self-determination and autonomy) remains. The
theoretical foundation of informed consent, originally articulated by Justice
Cardozo in Schloendorff v. Society of The New York Hospital as the right to
self-determination, has evolved over the years, but the emphasis on the
patient’s autonomy remains.92 Although many genetic privacy acts seek to
protect individual rights in autonomy and privacy, genetic information does not
always affect autonomy and privacy. Because there is harm in overprotecting
genetic information, the key becomes developing a method to distinguish
between when the law should and should not protect genetic information.
D. Not All Tissue Genetics Is the Same—Tumor Genetics vs. Germline
Mutations
An individual’s interests in his or her genetic information depends upon
the kind of tissue used in the genetic research. Some commentators note that
genetic research is considered sensitive because it often involves highly
predictive germline mutations in bad diseases like breast or ovarian cancer.93
This kind of germline research is likely to uncover genetic information that
implicates family members in addition to the individual whose tissue is
examined (the proband, in the language of genetics). However, when the
research is on tumor mutations, not germline mutations, it is often not
predictive of family risk (depending on the type of tumor). Much research
performed on tissue-banked material is research looking at tumor genetics and
not germline mutations.
Admittedly, all cancer may be genetic, but it is to varying degrees
heritable.94 The risk of any person of getting cancer, including sporadic
tumors, is influenced by various hereditary and environmental factors. For
example, most lung cancer is strongly related to cigarette smoking, but the
mortality rates of people with lung cancer are greater among non-smoking
relatives of smokers than among non-smokers who do not have any smokers in

92. Schloendorff v. Soc’y of the N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914). In Schloendorff,
Justice Cardozo wrote: “Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to
determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation
without his patient’s consent, commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages.” Id. at 9596. For a brief account of how the informed consent theory evolved from Cardozo’s common
law battery-based approach to the recent negotiated terms that depend fundamentally on patientdoctor discourse, see Ken Marcus Gatter, Protecting Patient-Doctor Discourse: Informed
Consent and Deliberative Autonomy, 78 OR. L. REV. 941 (1999).
93. Laura M. Beskow et al., Informed Consent for Population-Based Research Involving
Genetics, 286 JAMA 2315 (2001).
94. See FINKLER, supra note 54, at 58 (examining the impact of a genetic basis of cancer
means for some people and maintaining that the emphasis on genetics turns some healthy people
into people who believe they are sick, yet without any of the signs or symptoms for which they
are at increased risk).
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their extended family.95 The influence of genetics on the development of
cancer in individuals is likely a continuum. On one side of the continuum are
the clearly inherited cancer syndromes like childhood retinoblastoma, where
carriers of the gene are 10,000 times at greater risk and the tumor is usually in
both eyes. At the same end of the continuum are certain breast and ovarian
cancers that present at a younger age than most breast and ovarian cancers and
are linked to the genes BRCA-1 and BRCA-2.96 These are non-sporadic
tumors.
At the other end of the continuum is the kind of colon cancer that presents
in a seventy-year-old man, or chronic myelogenous leukemia (CML), a cancer
of the blood and bone marrow, presenting in a fifty-year-old individual. These
“sporadic” or “spontaneous” cancers do not run in families. Although
researchers may ultimately find a hereditary component to the degree of risk
for particular cancers in every individual, the particular genetic event studied
by scientists does not have any known hereditary component. For example,
CML involves a translocation of a piece of chromosome nine and a piece of
chromosome twenty-two. This translocation is neither present at birth nor in
the person’s non-leukemic cells. Perhaps there is a genetic clue in the
germline genetics of patients who later on develop CML that we do not yet
know about, and a researcher would not find it if studying the leukemia cells.
Therefore, even if there is an undiscovered hereditary component to a sporadic
tumor, research looking at the sporadic tumor genetics is some distance away
from identifying genetic information of the individual from whom the cancer
arises.
Although many researchers believe that genetic predisposition contributes
to most “spontaneous” tumors,97 the degree of increased risk in the colon
cancer in the seventy-year-old man that is represented by genetic
predisposition is significantly less than the risk that is represented by the
presence of the retinoblastoma gene in the five-year-old boy. Should the legal
protections be the same for the “relevant” genetic information in the five-yearold boy and the statistically insignificant genetic information in the seventyyear-old man? Similarly, why should the law protect genetic information that
represents, for example, a statistically insignificant increase in colon cancer
risk in a seventy-year-old man and not protect information that indicates that if
a fifty-year-old individual eats nothing but fatty fast food, that individual is
likely to have a much greater risk of a heart attack? Perhaps both pieces of

95. COTRAN ET AL., supra note 70, at 275.
96. Id. at 276.
97. Id.
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information deserve privacy protections (and should be medically confidential)
as pieces of information that comprise the whole of personal identity.98
E.

Most Research Produces Genetic Information with Little Impact on
Individual Identity

Another reason why the research context is important is that most scientific
research addresses small questions with little or no impact on individual
identity. Not only do researchers rarely ask questions that are clinically
significant by themselves, but the research seldom answers the questions
without requiring additional research.99 This is not to say the research is
clinically insignificant, but this research serves as only a small piece of a larger
puzzle. Moreover, scientists must generally verify the results and conduct
additional research because the results give rise to new questions. Nonverified pieces of genetic information that lack clinical significance should not
impact individual identity. Admittedly, however, a risk remains that insurers,
employers, researchers, participants and families may use the information
improperly and erroneously interpret the results if the information is linked to
an individual or a group. The accuracy of the conclusions drawn from the
genetic information is largely irrelevant when genetic information is linked to
an individual or a group and therefore suffers harm from improper use.
F.

Identifying Information

The problem is that genetic information about tumors and normal tissue
means little unless genotype can be correlated with phenotype. Researchers
need to correlate genetic information with clinical information to reach any
meaningful conclusions.100 For example, discovering that a particular tumor
expresses a new protein is only valuable if a researcher has access to
information about how the new protein may be related to clinical information.
Relevant clinical information includes such things as the tumor and patient

98. The recent explosion in Internet personal data has lead to many articles discussing
informational privacy issues. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52
STAN. L. REV. 1125 (2000) (discussing various approaches, including the property rights model
and a market-oriented system that uses a system with a default licensing of personal data
provision); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609
(1999) (arguing that privacy norms are important for democracy).
99. For example, a recent issue of BLOOD published the following articles: Olivier Giet et
al., Increased Binding and Defective Migration Across Fibronectin of Cycling Hematopoietic
Progenitor Cells, 99 BLOOD 2023 (2002); Letetia C. Jones et al., Expression of C/EPP from the
C/ebp Gene Locus is Sufficient for Normal Hematopoiesis In Vivo, 99 BLOOD 2032 (2002).
Admittedly, not all titles are so esoteric, however, isolated study results mean little to an
individual study participant and the results are unlikely to lead to identification of the study
participants without further identifying information.
100. See generally Beskow et al., supra note 93.
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behavior, how long and how well did the patient live, what kind of treatment
was given, how far the tumor had spread (stage), what the tumor looked like
(grade and type) and the age and strength of the patient. Once a researcher has
access to sufficient patient-identifying information, then the researcher,
research subject or some other person might be able to identify the individual.
It is when the individual’s identity can be discovered that the legal
protections of the individual and the individual’s genetic family become
important. Even if the genetic information derived from research is not enough
to draw valid scientific conclusions, legal protections are warranted when the
information and the identity of the individual might be linked. Once the
individual is indentifiable, there is a risk that the information may be
improperly used by insurers or employers, or that researchers, participants,
families or others may erroneously interpret the results.
The law properly protects linked information because it is medical
information, not because it is genetic information. Both the genetic
information and the clinical information deserve legal protection. An
individual’s legal rights should be implicated depending on the substantive
attributes of the information, rather than the single attribute of the information
being genetic. For example, genetic information that impacts identity would
include something like the retinoblastoma gene, because this reasonably affects
how individuals think of themselves. Certainly, many patients with cancer
undergo a significant change in their identity. Lance Armstrong, who won the
Tour de France bike race four years in a row (as of winter 2003) after he had
cancer, apparently underwent a significant change in the way he viewed
himself and life because of his high stage cancer and his close brush with
death. Similarly, people who learn that they carry a gene that significantly
increases their risk for a particular cancer also feel an impact on their identity.
Genetic information that reveals that a person and her family have an increased
risk for an autoimmune disease impacts the identity of the individual and the
whole family.
It is when the genetic information reasonably impacts identity that the law
should implement increased protections. This can be accomplished without
leading to deleterious change in the social meaning of genetic information.
PART IV—THE TORT OF MISAPPROPRIATION OF IDENTITY APPLIED TO
GENETIC INFORMATION
A.

Identity as the Touchstone for Legal Protection of Genetic Information

Treating all research contexts identically because they involve any aspect
of genetic information is an example of genetic essentialism that alters the
social meaning of genetic information. To avoid these pitfalls, legal
protections for genetic information in the research context should focus on the
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substantive content of the information to assign the appropriate degree of
protection for the genetic information. I propose that legal protections are
appropriate for genetic information that reasonably impacts individual identity.
The focus on the impact on individual identity allows the law to better
recognize the context and substantive content of the genetic information.
For example, this approach would mandate legal protections for genetic
information that uncovers a significant risk for the development of a
neurodegenerative disorder because this is genetic information that reasonably
impacts identity. In contrast, genetic information arising in the research
context that has minimal clinically significant repercussions for the individual,
while still confidential and legally protected because it is confidential medical
information, would not merit legal protection as specifically protected genetic
information because it does not reasonably impact individual identity.
The law would still require general consent before researchers could use
the patient’s tissue for research. However, by taking into consideration the
context and focusing on the substance of the genetic information, the legal
protection for genetic information would not treat all genetic information the
same based only on the seemingly overriding fact of the information being
genetic. Moreover, identity provides a more solid theoretical foundation for
the protection of genetic information. This approach would require that special
legal protections for genetic information derived from retrospective research
performed on banked tissue, and would apply only when the genetic
information reasonably impacts individual identity.
The initial threshold for implementing legal protections for genetic
information should be that the genetic information is linked to a patient or
group. Commentators generally agree that research using non-linkable data, or
anonymous data, does not invoke consent requirements.101 Recall, however,
that even anonymous genetic information, if it is linked to a group, can have
adverse consequences for all members of the group. For example, many
researchers have looked specifically at Ashkenazi Jews. Professor Dolgin
states that the disproportionate research attention paid to Ashkenazi Jews has
led to a disproportionate number of genetic alterations being associated with
Ashkenazi Jews, thereby reinforcing public perceptions that this group is more
likely to suffer from genetic alterations, and, thus, furthering historical antiSemitic attitudes of Jewish people as more sickly.102 Dolgin’s description of
the adverse impact of genetic information on group identity reinforces the
appropriateness of identity as the touchstone for legal protection of genetic

101. See Patricia (Winnie) Roche et al., The Genetic Privacy Act: A Proposal for National
Legislation, 37 JURIMETRICS J. 1 (1996); George J. Annas, Rules for Research on Human Genetic
Variation—Lessons from Iceland, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1830 (2000).
102. Dolgin, supra note 21, at 790-794.
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information rather than the reliance on a privacy right for the theoretical
foundation.
The second question to be reached before deciding if legal protections
should attach to genetic information should be whether the particular genetic
information will reasonably impact individual identity.
For example,
information from a clinical test result that identifies an individual as carrying a
gene for hemochromatosis deserves protection because a person’s identity is
reasonably impacted by knowing that one has the disease and its likely
sequelae. However, a genetic research result discovering an esoteric tumor
protein, while still legally protected as confidential medical information (if
linked to an individual person), should not invoke special legal protections.
Many genetic privacy statutes are over broad in that they ignore the
question of context and fail to delineate different kinds of genetic information.
These shortcomings foster a genetic essentialism that undermines the value we
traditionally place in individual autonomy.103 A small and clinically
insignificant bit of an individual’s genetic information is no more private and
should enjoy no more legal protections than the color of her hair or the size of
her foot. When enough bits of information come together, like enough pixels
on a screen can become a recognizable face, then an individual’s identity may
be discovered and legal safeguards should apply. Similarly, if a truly unique
bit of information is uncovered, then it too should enjoy legal safeguards. In
both the quantitative and the qualitative versions, the focus is on what the
information means rather than simply the single attribute of the information’s
genetic character. This approach avoids the definitional difficulties of what
constitutes genetic information. It also avoids fostering a climate of genetic
exceptionalism and provides a theoretical framework for the complex task of
organizing and regulating the collection, storage and use of genetic
information.
B.

Appropriation of Identity

Jonathan Kahn advocates the tort of appropriation of identity as a way for
the law to protect individual dignity interests and maintain “a legally
sanctioned space that places control over the self beyond the reach of the
market.”104 In a recent article, Kahn advocates using the privacy-based tort of
103. See generally id.
104. Kahn, Bringing Dignity Back to Light, supra note 10, at 214. He aims to “disentangle
publicity and privacy” because he is concerned that the more common publicity right, based on
property, has hidden the other important concerns that appropriation of identity protects, such as
privacy and dignity. Id. Whereas publicity rights involve commercial interests, courts have also
protected personal interests in dignity and integrity of the self. To illustrate that courts recognize
the difference, Kahn cites various cases, including Onassis v. Christian Dior-N.Y., Inc., 472
N.Y.S.2d 254 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984). In this case, Jacqueline Onassis sued Christian Dior, Inc.
because Christian Dior used an advertisement with a look alike of her without permission. Id. at
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appropriation of identity to resolve the often-cited and often-discussed case of
Moore v. Regents of the University of California.105 He maintains that the
current principles of intellectual property law and informed consent do not
resolve the complex issues of biotechnology represented in Moore.106 Instead,
Kahn argues that appropriation of identity, discussed by the California Court of
Appeal in Moore,107 provides the basis for a better resolution of the problems
raised by Moore.
Kahn’s insight is valuable because it illustrates a way to provide legal
recognition of a right in genetic information that is not derivative of an
underlying property right in tissue and does not exclusively focus on the
genetic attributes of the information. Moreover, his approach recognizes a
continuum of legal interests based on the degree of the impact on individual
identity.
Kahn’s focus on the relationship between object (cells in Moore, genetic
information in the present case) and identity allows him to implement a
spectrum, or continuum, of legal protections. He is able to do this because he
does not simply look at the relationship between the object and the physical
body or simply focus on the object or information. Kahn describes his

256. She sought an injunction rather than monetary damages because she was not asserting an
infringement of her commercial right to publicize her image. See id. Instead, she wanted to
protect her identity as a person who does not engage in the commercialization of her image.
105. Kahn, Biotechnology, supra note 10, at 910-11. See also Charlotte H. Harrison, Neither
Moore nor the Market: Alternative Models for Compensating Contributors of Human Tissue, 28
AM. J.L. & MED. 77 (2002); Peter Halewood, Law’s Bodies: Disembodiment and the Structure of
Liberal Property Rights, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1331 (1996); Laura M. Ivey, Moore v. Regents of the
University of California: Insufficient Protection of Patients’ Rights in the Biotechnological
Market, 25 GA. L. REV. 489 (1991); Stephen Ashley Mortinger, Spleen for Sale: Moore v.
Regents of the University of California and the Right to Sell Parts of Your Body, 51 OHIO ST. L.J.
499 (1990); Jeffrey A. Potts, Note, Moore v. Regents of the University of California: Expanded
Disclosure, Limited Property Rights, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 453 (1992).
106. Kahn, Biotechnology, supra note 10, at 911. In Moore, the patient, John Moore, had
treatment of his hairy cell leukemia at the University of California, Los Angeles, Medical Center
(UCLA-MC), where Dr. Golde confirmed the diagnosis, and John Moore’s spleen was removed
as part of the then accepted treatment for hairy cell leukemia. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of
Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 480-81 (Cal. 1990). After the procedure, the doctors and researchers at
UCLA-MC encouraged John Moore to return for follow-up, in part so that they could get more of
Moore’s hairy leukemia cells. Id. at 481. After approximately three years, Golde and a
researcher established a cell line and the Regents of the University of California applied for a
patent. Id. at 481-82. When Moore discovered this, he sued, claiming a property-based right in a
share of profits. Id. at 482. He did not claim that his dignity, privacy, or identity had been legally
harmed. The California Supreme Court held that Moore’s doctor had breached his fiduciary duty
and that informed consent was not adequate, but further rejected Moore’s conversion claim. Id. at
485, 488. The Court of Appeal’s discussion about appropriation of identity was not seriously
considered by the majority in the California Supreme Court decision.
107. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 249 Cal. Rptr. 494, 507-08 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
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approach as “a legal regime for the management of information . . . . in this
case, information regarded as intimately bound up with a subject’s identity.”108
In explaining appropriation of identity, Kahn explains that it is the
improper use of another’s name or image, rather than the physical property or
body, that historically gave rise to the tort.109 There must be a connection
between the image or name and a person’s identity. Kahn comments about
how remarkable it is that the law recognizes such an “amorphous concept as
‘identity’”110 and notes that courts have expanded the right to include improper
use of another’s voice111 and objects that invoke a person’s identity but may be
separate from their physical person, as in Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co.112
In Motschenbacher, a racing car driver sued R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Company for improperly using his recognizable racing car in an advertisement
without his permission.113 The case concerned an advertisement starring
Motschenbacher’s race car, which Motschenbacher uniquely identified with
special markings.114 Although Motschenbacher was not recognizable in the
advertisement, words promoting the defendant’s cigarettes were indirectly
attributed to Motschenbacher because words in a text balloon were placed next
to the unrecognizable racing car driver sitting in the recognizable car.115 The
plaintiff established that many people recognized the car as Motschenbacher’s,
but the trial court dismissed the case because the plaintiff was not directly
identified and the racing car was, in effect, too far removed from the
plaintiff.116 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed, reasoning that the
use of the distinctively Motschenbacher car implied Motschenbacher as the
driver.117 The court, therefore, recognized the car as a constitutive part of
Motschenbacher’s identity.
Alternatively, the court recognized that
Motschenbacher imprinted parts of the car with aspects of his identity.118 The
court’s implicit holding was that the constitutive object is connected to the
individual’s identity.
Moore’s case is problematic because of the difficulties in characterizing
Moore’s legal rights in his tissue. The history of the case, from the diversity of
the decisions and opinions of the three courts that dealt with the facts to the

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Kahn, Biotechnology, supra note 10, at 911.
Id.
Id. at 917.
See Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 822-23.
Motschenbacher, 498 F.2d at 827.
See id.
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different views offered in the extensive commentary on the case, highlights the
difficulty of defining individual interests in information derived from human
tissue. Moore wanted monetary compensation and eschewed any identity
aspects of his claim, despite the California Court of Appeal’s sympathy for a
claim that Moore’s identity was misappropriated. He wanted to share in the
profits from the cell line derived from his cells and centered his claim on
conversion of his personal property (his cells). The trial court dismissed the
claim, but the California Court of Appeal reversed, writing that, “a patient
must have the ultimate power to control what becomes of his or her tissues. To
hold otherwise would open the door to a massive invasion of human privacy
and dignity in the name of medical progress.”119 The California Court of
Appeal expressed interest in allowing Moore’s claim, but was concerned about
commercialization of the human body and the potential detrimental effects on
human dignity.120 It is this concern with dignity and the effects on identity that
likely influenced the California Court of Appeal to advocate an appropriation
of identity claim, and influenced the reasoning that DNA deserved the same
protections as a name or image because DNA was constitutive of a person’s
identity.
In the end, the California Supreme Court rejected the Court of Appeal’s
appropriation of identity approach and Moore’s conversion claim.121 In part,
the California Supreme Court dismissed the appropriation argument because
Moore insisted on the property aspects of his claim. Quickly dismissing the
appropriation argument as “irrelevant to the issue of conversion,”122 the
Supreme Court settled instead on the doctor’s breach of fiduciary duty.
Because Moore’s physician was also the researcher who used Moore’s cells,
the court reasoned that the physician failed to fulfill his fiduciary duty when he
did not tell Moore the whole story about his interests in obtaining Moore’s
cells.123 Thus, the California Supreme Court sidestepped the more difficult
issue of characterizing Moore’s legal interest in his cells. The California
Supreme Court decided that there is no property right in one’s cells, but that

119. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 249 Cal. Rptr. 494, 508 (Cal Ct. App. 1988).
120. Kahn, Biotechnology, supra note 10, at 918-19.
121. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S.
936 (1990).
122. Id. at 490. There is extensive commentary on the property right issue in Moore. See
Peter Halewood, Law’s Bodies: Disembodiment and the Structure of Liberal Property Rights, 81
IOWA L. REV. 1331 (1996); Laura M. Ivey, Moore v. Regents of the University of California:
Insufficient Protection of Patients’ Rights in the Biotechnological Market, 25 GA. L. REV. 489
(1991); Stephen Ashley Mortinger, Spleen for Sale: Moore v. Regents of the University of
California and the Right to Sell Parts of Your Body, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 499 (1990); Jeffrey A. Potts,
Moore v. Regents of the University of California: Expanded Disclosure, Limited Property Rights,
86 NW. U. L. REV. 453 (1992).
123. Moore, 793 P.2d at 486.
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somehow legal interests attach to these cells because it is important that the
doctor or researcher tells patients what will happen to them.
The California Supreme Court did implicitly recognize a connection
between the patient or research subject and the cells after they are removed
from the body, although the adequacy of the conventional informed consent
(consent for removing the spleen in the first place) was not at issue. However,
it is unclear whether the parameters of the informed consent requirements were
influenced by the physician or researcher’s intentions or by the fact that the
patient retained some uncharacterized interest in the cells after removal from
the body.
The case remains controversial because of its failure to give Moore much
of anything. The case is cited by some science researchers for the idea that
patients do not retain any interests in their tissue once they have given
conventional informed consent.124 The case is instructive because it introduces
issues that remain largely unsettled today. Many commentators advocate, and
rare state statutes maintain, that genetic information is a property right.125 One
of the core provisions in the model genetic privacy act written by Professor
Annas, is that, “DNA is the property of the individual from whom it is
obtained.”126 Oregon’s initial Genetic Privacy Act characterized a person’s
genetic information as property, stating, “An individual’s genetic information
and DNA sample are the property of the individual . . . .”127 Subsequently, the
Oregon legislature revised the statute and characterized the individual’s right
in genetic information as a privacy right. Although most state and federal
approaches allow a privacy right in genetic information, the difficulty in
characterizing the right precisely remains. One advantage of using the tort of
appropriation of identity is that it combines aspects of property and privacy128
law and its inherent fluidity is well suited to the difficulty of characterizing
genetic information.
Kahn makes an important distinction between the privacy-based tort of
appropriation of identity, which relies on the individual’s interest in
maintaining “integrity of identity,” and the more common property-based right
124. See, e.g., discussion supra note 87.
125. See, e.g., Thomas E. Colonna, Protection of Privacy in Personal Genetic Information, 2
W. VA. J. L. & TECH. 2.1, ¶ 47 (June 10, 1998), at http://www.wvu.edu/~wvjolt/Arch/Colonn/
Colonn.htm. (“Providing individuals with control over their personal genetic information is
accomplished first by establishing that an individually identifiable DNA sample is the property of
the individual who is the source of the DNA sample.”).
126. Roche et al., supra note 101, at 4.
127. See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 659.036, 659.227, 659.700, 659.705, 659.710, 659.715, 659.720,
659.990, 746.135 (1997). For an internet site explaining some of the legislative history, see
What’s Going on Now? Oregon Genetic Privacy Act, at http://www.geneforum.org/learnmore/gp/
or_gpa.cfm (last visited Sept. 13, 2002).
128. See generally Kahn, Bringing Dignity Back to Light, supra note 10; Kahn,
Biotechnology, supra note 10.
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of publicity, which involves the commercial value of one’s likeness. For
example, when Jacqueline Onassis sued Christian Dior, Inc. because the
fashion design company used an advertisement with a look alike of Onassis
without Onassis’ permission, she based her claim on a privacy-centered
appropriation of identity claim because she did not want to be known as
someone who allowed her likeness to be used for selling things.129 Her action
relied on a broad interpretation of the New York Civil Rights law, which
prohibited a “person, firm or corporation” from using for commercial purposes
the “name, portrait or picture of any living person” without prior written
permission.130 Christian-Dior did not use a picture of Onassis or make any
direct reference to her name. In its decision, the New York court focused on
the word “portrait” in the statute and traced case law back seventy years to
conclude that “[t]he principle to be distilled from a study of the statute and of
the cases construing it is that all persons, of whatever station in life, from the
relatively unknown to the world famous, are to be secured against rapacious
commercial exploitation.”131 The statute, the court reasoned, was “intended to
protect the essence of the person, his or her identity or persona from being
unwillingly or unknowingly misappropriated for the profit of another.”132
Interestingly, Onassis and the court emphasized the dignity aspects of the
underlying right. Onassis did this by seeking an injunction rather than
monetary damages, and the court stressed that the right belonged to every
person, to the poor and unknown, and to the rich and famous. Notwithstanding
this emphasis on dignity, the court and the statute limit the legal protections to
infringements of individual dignity to the commercial context. This result,
Kahn claims, is from courts failing to distinguish properly between the two
separate torts of publicity and appropriation of identity.133
As mentioned before, an important aspect of the tort of appropriation of
identity is its reliance on the relationship between the individual identity and
the image, or voice or part of an individual’s identity that was appropriated.
The fact that everyone’s fingerprints are unique does not merit legal
protections for the fingerprint unless it reasonably impacts the individual’s
identity. A stranger might lift my fingerprint from a public handrail and
publish its image without me suffering any harm. If the stranger attaches my

129. Onassis v. Christian Dior-N.Y., Inc., 472 N.Y.S.2d 254, 256 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984).
130. Id. at 258 (quoting Section 50 and 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law, including the
following passage from Section 50: “A person, firm or corporation that uses for advertising
purposes, or for the purpose of trade, the name, portrait or picture of any living person without
having first obtained the written consent of such person . . . is guilty of a misdemeanor.”)
131. Id. at 260 (emphasis added).
132. Id.
133. Kahn, Bringing Dignity Back to Light, supra note 10, at 233. According to Kahn,
“appropriation cases are driven in significant part by a logic of privacy rights even as they employ
the rhetoric of publicity.” Id.
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picture to the fingerprint, then I may have a legal claim that my identity has
been unreasonably impacted, but the focus of the claim would be on how
publishing the picture impacts my identity rather than the fingerprints. If the
stranger added a caption proclaiming my appreciation for a commercial
product, then I have a stronger legal claim because the impact on my identity is
increased. However, the underlying claim remains based on the recognizable
picture rather than the fingerprint.
Is genetic information more like the unique fingerprint or the unique
picture? The answer, of course, depends on the type of genetic information
and how intimately the information addressed by the genetic information
connects to an individual. If over time my fingerprint becomes associated with
me and my fingerprint becomes recognizable by a significant number of people
(whatever that number may be), then a connection exists between my
fingerprint and my identity. It is only after a sufficient connection exists that
the use of my fingerprint alone may reasonably impact my identity, like how
Motschenbacher’s car impacted Motschenbacher’s identity. Therefore, the use
of a single fingerprint that does not reasonably impact my identity does not
merit special legal safeguards because a piece of genetic information that does
not impact identity should not invoke special legal protections. Genetic
information in the research context that has uncertain, unverified and no
clinically accepted meaning is unlikely to reasonably impact an individual’s
identity.
This brief scenario illustrates two points. The first is the importance of the
relational aspects. Kahn recognized this and wrote, “[I]t is the relationship
between an individual and a particular image that establishes whether her
identity is bound up in the image. The court’s opinion overlooks this relational
aspect of identity, simply asserting the material basis of identity in DNA.”134
A short strip of DNA, lacking any unique features, will not impact identity
even if it is linked to an individual. Analogously, my identity is not impacted
if some stranger collects a fingerprint, which ends up being mine, as part of an
art project, unless my fingerprint was somehow, like Motschenbacher’s car,
well known as my fingerprint. Only by establishing a connection between the
individual and a unique piece of genetic information (and not all genetic
information is unique) will there be an impact on identity.
The second point is how the tort of appropriation of identity relies on
social norms and community standards. Kahn, contrasting publicity with
appropriation, notes that determining if something constitutes appropriation is
governed by local community standards, social norms and democratic control:
Publicity rights demand accountants and other relevant experts from the realm
of celebrity and marketing to determine damages. Appropriation calls upon
the local community to consider whether an outrage or affront to relevant
134. Kahn, Biotechnology, supra note 10, at 927.
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social norms has occurred. The former involves the virtues and vices of expert
management. The latter similarly involve the virtues and vices of local
democratic control.135

Allowing social norms and community standards to determine when one’s
identity is impacted introduces reasonableness. Under this rubric, one can
envision how a research subject might successfully claim that her identity was
appropriated when researchers used the subject’s genetic information in, for
example, fetal research without telling the subject. Such use would reasonably
impact the research subject’s identity. It might violate relevant social norms.
Similarly, this approach allows the conclusion that Moore’s identity was
impacted by knowing that a cell line, which was essentially a clone of a piece
of him, was distributed around the country.
The reliance on social norms and community standards used by the tort of
appropriation of identity would permit researchers to use genetic information
derived from routinely-banked tissue (with routine informed consent) provided
the genetic information did not impact an individual’s identity. The
determination of whether use of genetic information reasonably impacts
identity would depend on community standards and social norms. The
researcher’s decision whether to go ahead with the research would necessitate
a judgment about the prevailing community standards and social norms.136 For
example, a researcher might use banked tissue for genetic research on a tumor
gene that has no significant impact on identity without getting additional
consent to that routinely obtained prior to invasive procedures. These consents
often include a general provision for the use of tissue for research.
Another facet of relying upon social norms and community standards is
that what is considered reasonable changes over time and varies by region. In
one jurisdiction, patients may be surprised to know that any genetic research
might be performed on their tissue and that any genetic information might
reasonably impact identity (for example, that genetic information used in fetal
tissue or cloning research might impact identity). One envisions, perhaps, a
rural hospital where tissue collected during diagnostic and therapeutic
procedures is, after diagnosis, sent to a far-away research laboratory for stem
cell research. In this kind of community, it makes sense to place the onus on
researchers or physicians to inform patients or research subjects of the
potential future use of their tissue. They might do this as part of the routine
informed consent form. It would also behoove researchers in this setting to

135. Kahn, Bringing Dignity Back to Light, supra note 10, at 215.
136. The proposed system would likely need either notice or regulatory provisions, or both.
The determinations would likely be made on a case-by-case basis by the various institutional
review boards (IRBs) as much as by individual researchers. Public notice provisions could also
be used to provide an additional layer of protection if IRSs fail to judge prevailing community
standards accurately. These issues are complex and beyond the confines of this article.
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engage in an aggressive publicity and public education program, with the hope
of changing the community perceptions about what reasonably impacts
identity. In contrast, there may be other jurisdictions where people do not
believe that every bit of genetic information impacts identity and patients who
consent to having their tissue used for research would not be surprised to
discover that researchers conduct future genetic research on this tissue.
In both jurisdictions, the advantage of the proposed approach is that it
would allow researchers an opportunity to explain how the pixel of genetic
information does not reasonably impact identity. Ultimately, the community
will decide whether the researcher made a correct judgment about the impact
of the genetic information on the individual’s identity. Moreover, the riskadverse researcher and institution would likely err on the side of obtaining
specific consent and make efforts to bring debate into the public arena.
There are risks to this approach. One risk is that this approach would not
offer an easy-to-follow, bright-line rule. But there are risks with bright line
rules too. Bright line rules can seem to simplify complex issues and, as in the
case of many genetic privacy rules, draw the line in the wrong place leading to
over-broad protections. Notwithstanding, a risk exists that an emphasis on the
prevailing community standards may not adequately protect individual
variations about what makes up a person’s identity. What may impact the
identity of one person may not impact another person’s identity.
For example, in Bitsie v. Walston, the Court of Appeals in New Mexico
concluded that a picture of an eighteen-month-old Navajo girl in a newspaper
article about a cerebral palsy fundraising project was not an invasion of
privacy as a matter of law, because the facts did not offend persons of
“ordinary sensibilities.”137 The court reached its conclusion despite accepting
that the evidence showed that traditional Navajo beliefs held that the use of the
picture of the toddler, a healthy girl without cerebral palsy, in association with
the disease was bad luck and increased her chances of getting a disease like
cerebral palsy.138 The court emphasized that “traditional” beliefs were
different from the “ordinary sensibilities” of “the developed society on which
the interest in privacy is based.”139 Although acknowledging that 20,000
Navajos lived in New Mexico with “traditional” beliefs, the court used a
unique concept of time and concluded that the tort of invasion of privacy did
not extend to these “traditional” beliefs because it only applied to the customs
137. 515 P.2d 659, 663 (N.M. Ct. App. 1973). Walston took a picture of eighteen-month-old
La Verne Bitsie with the consent of La Verne’s father. Id. at 661. Later, a newspaper article
about note cards by local artists that were sold to benefit the cerebral palsy fund included a
picture taken by Walston of La Verne Bitsie. Id.
138. Id. at 662 (“The evidence then is that the newspaper story was offensive to traditional
Navajos.”).
139. Id. (The court reminded the reader that the interest in privacy is one that “appears only
in comparatively highly developed state of society.”)
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of New Mexico at the time the case was decided.140 It did not matter that
20,000 people held these traditional beliefs at the time court published its
decision. It would seem that 20,000 people with a shared belief system are
enough to qualify as a community and formulate social norms. The dissent
recognized the error, writing, “It is erroneous to say that traditional Navajo
Indians are not people with ‘ordinary sensibilities.’ The same could then be
said of Irish-Americans, Mexican-Americans, Chinese-Americans, black
people, Catholics, Protestants and Jews.”141
Bitsie raises important concerns. The Navajo view toward the increased
risk resulting from the association of the toddler’s picture with cerebral palsy is
similar to the majority view about genetic information. Many people fear the
potential of genetic information to predict the future and believe that this
information reasonably impacts identity. The association of DNA sequences
with the development of subsequent disease are cast in terms of increased risk.
Some might argue that it is the mathematical likelihood of the subsequent
event that affects the degree that one’s identity is reasonably impacted. Some
might argue that the Navajo’s claim is invalid because there is no rational
connection between the picture and the development of disease. However, a
better approach is that the reasonableness is measured in terms of the relevant
community’s belief in how the individual’s identity will be impacted.
Applying the tort of appropriation of identity to the context of genetic
information means that we must be sensitive to the fact that different people
will have different ideas about what reasonably impacts identity. But it is this
variation in views that makes a common-law based remedy applicable.
PART V—CONCLUSION
In summary, two important points make appropriation of identity well
suited to genetic information. First, it recognizes the importance of the
relationship between the individual and the object. The tort, therefore,
recognizes a continuum of proper legal protections based on the context within
which genetic information is collected and used and on the substantive content
of the genetic information. A legal system that conveys a recognition of the
prevailing importance of individual identity from DNA will look at the
substantive content of genetic information rather than only focusing on the fact
that the information is genetic. Because the context within which genetic
information is collected, studied, stored, and otherwise used will effect the
impact genetic information has on individual identity, the degree of legal
protection should be tailored to the context. Recognition of context is one
critical method for the law to reflect further understanding that the degree of

140. Id.
141. Id. at 667 (Sutin, J., dissenting).
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protection rests on the extent to which the genetic information impacts
individual identity.
Second, reliance on identity as the keystone in this proposed system of
governing how to best protect individual genetic information is a better fit than
privacy law. Identity is constantly created by ourselves and those around us.
This process happens in the privacy of our homes, in the public arena of the
workplace, the schoolyard, the classroom, the athletic arena, and the public
square. It is both conscious and accidental, active and passive. The underlying
right to privacy is different from publicity because the right to publicity
emphasizes the marketplace and one’s commercial worth. Identity, like
privacy, is in part a dignity interest that all of us possess, but identity more
directly implicates the result of choices made by individuals. Many of us to
varying extents can choose our profession, spouses, friends, and acquaintances.
The misuse of genetic information impacts one’s identity and the ability to
create, or influence, one’s identity. Ironically, legal protections that treat all
genetic information as synonymous with identity reduce individual opportunity
to actively participate in forming an identity.142 Such legal protections change
the social meaning of all genetic information by exclusively looking at the
genetic attributes of the information instead of examining the substantive
content and the context of the information. Despite good intentions, these
kinds of genetic privacy acts encourage the kind of genetic reductionism
echoed by Crick’s words quoted earlier.
Certainly, there should be legal protections against genetic discrimination
and reasonable safeguards for privacy and confidentiality, but these must be
done rationally. The tort of appropriation of identity offers a fluid,
community-based tool that incorporates changing social norms and recognizes
the contexts within which genetic information arises. Whether adopted or not,
the emphasis on identity is a better starting point for us to analyze the difficult
and unanswered issues of genetic information.

142. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.

